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Adjudicating Social Death: Caste





1 A cartoon published in an Indian daily, during the debates regarding the re-inclusion,
after an 80-year hiatus, of the category of caste in the decennial census of 2011, shows a
destitute  man crouching on the ground and rather  proudly  telling the census  agent
standing in front of him “… no house, no address, no occupation, no income… but sir, I
have  a  caste!”1 The  cartoon  illustrates  the  common  assumption  that  since  caste  is
determined  by  birth,  membership  in  that  caste  is  immutable.  However,  in  certain
circumstances, membership in the birth group can be controversial. Indeed, a number of
situations  may arise  where  an  individual’s  membership  in  his  or  her  birth  group is
challenged,  such  as  conversion,  renouncement  or  repudiation  of  one’s  birth  group,
children  of  an  inter-caste  and/or  inter-confessional  marriage  and  so-called  “caste
exclusions.”2 Over the last two centuries, the relation between law and caste membership
has been rather chaotic due to the changing conceptions and legislations of the scope of
jurisdiction of castes over their members. An investigation into the rights of castes to
exclude (excommunicate) their members reveals the ever complex relationship between
the state judiciary and caste society. Though the relationship between caste(s) and the
State (pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial) boasts a voluminous bibliography, many
aspects  still  remain  unexplored  and  their  characterizations  unchallenged.  This
contribution ventures into one of these blind spots, that of the legal trajectory, during the
colonial period, of castes’ rights to exclude their members. To address this question, we
venture into the Madras High Court over a period of seventy years (1880s-1950s). During
this  time frame,  we will  discover  how the  complexity  of  legally  accommodating  the
principle  of  caste  autonomy,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  promoting  and
defending civil rights, led the courts, through the voices of their judges, to an excessively
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difficult, if not paradoxical exercise of defining when (and how) their own jurisdiction
should give way to a myriad of caste jurisdictions. The ambition of this contribution is not
to describe and assess the vast ocean of the literature on caste during the colonial period
but to follow as closely and precisely as possible the legal trajectory of the phenomenon
of “caste excommunication,” as it reveals in a somewhat different light several of the
standard understandings of the relationship between State, caste society and law.
2 Among Hindus, caste exclusion is the severance of an individual’s religious, social and
economic relations with his birth group. Losing one’s caste, or “falling” from one’s caste—
to borrow the Sanskrit term employed in the earliest description of this phenomenon—
constitutes the most severe form of punishment handed down by caste panchayats, as
they  do  not  practice  (in  Tamil  Nadu  at  least)  executions  or  incarcerations.3 Caste
exclusion  occurs  when  a  severe  infraction  to  kin-caste  rules  is  committed.  The  last
scholar to have written with some depth on caste exclusion, Robert Hayden, skillfully
summarized the four standard features of caste exclusion such as they are found in the
anthropological writings between the early 1950s and the late 1970s.4 They define caste
exclusion as:
1. an imposed state,
2. either temporary or permanent,
3. the ultimate punishment within a range of sanctions
4. resulting in severe disruption of social relations.
3 In his article, Hayden goes on to say that these standard views of caste excommunication
severely misconstrue the work of caste panchayats among the nomadic Nandiwallas he
studied. However in the context of both the colonial court archives studied here, as well
as my fieldwork in South India, these features are both useful and operational to describe
caste excommunication. In the course of my research on legal culture in Tamil villages, I
have found Hayden’s features to be accurate but also that four other features of caste
excommunications were pertinent to characterize the lived practice of this phenomenon.
These are that caste excommunication can take the form of (5) a coercive threat, (6) an
oath,  a  pledge  (satyam),  (7)  a  contagious  affliction  to  be  avoided,  and  finally  (8)  a
hereditary condition. As we will see in the course of this contribution, these last four
features, so prominent in the village setting, are fairly inconsequential in the law courts.
4 Whether in a village setting or an urban setting, whether a century-and-a-half ago or last
year,  the  consequences  of  being  excommunicated  from one’s  caste  are  quite  simply
disastrous and it results, among other things, in the inability to participate in religious
celebrations of the family, lineage and locality, to carry out life-cycle rituals (such as the
marriage of one’s children or the funerary rites for one’s parents), to draw water from the
common source  (or  in  having  your  water  connection  cut  off),  to  employ  and  to  be
employed (as) daily-wage laborers in the locality, to purchase or sell daily produce in the
locality, right down to the opportunity to enjoy a morning chat at the local tea shop or
watching  your  favorite  TV  show  in  the  evening  as  your  cable  network  has  been
disconnected.
5 Before turning our attention to the issue at stake in this contribution, that is the legal
trajectory of caste exclusion in the colonial court, it is useful to take a step back and
outline the circumstances which led me to look into the archives of this rather arcane
judicial phenomenon. My research focuses on present day conflict management at the
village level  in contemporary Tamil  Nadu and more particularly on the trajectory of
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conflicts and the various forums these conflicts might traverse during their life. In the
rural context I focus on in south-central Tamil Nadu, a given conflict will pass through
one or often several of five forums in its quest for resolution: state forums (the police, the
courts), customary forums (village panchayat, caste panchayat), occult forums (practices
of  sorcery and counter sorcery),  divine forums (appeals  to deities  possessing judicial
efficiency) and finally criminal forums (local mafia organizations, caste-based pressure
groups). From this broad context of investigation, I have over the past few years been
focusing  largely  on  so-called  caste  norms  and  customary  law,  and  especially  on  the
functioning of caste panchayats. Alongside this personal research, I have been locating
and digitizing, with a team of Tamil colleagues, a vast amount of archival data (paper
documents, palm-leaves and copper plates) held in private homes in the villages I work in
but  also  further  afield.5 While  rather  extensively  examining  caste  panchayat
documentation produced in small  villages  in the district  of  Madurai  during the first
decades  of  the  20th century,  I  was  stunned  to  come across  petitions  and  judgments
pertaining to the use of caste exclusion as the most severe sanction handed down by
either the headman of the sub-caste (here the Pramalai Kallar) or simply by the local
village panchayattars. The reason for my surprise was threefold.
6 Firstly,  the  very  existence  of  these  documents  confounded  me.  They  unravel  the
commonly  held  premise  that  panchayats  operate(d)  on  the  basis  of  purely  oral
procedures.  In India,  “customary law,” as we may somewhat uncomfortably label the
rules and norms that govern social and religious behavior within specific birth groups,
are clearly established as part of the oral tradition(s). However, these written petitions
and judgments were produced by and for local caste panchayats. In the instances I have
examined, the written legal documentation starts appearing during the first decades of
the 19th century.6
7 The second reason of my surprise was that I had dutifully read in the monograph of the
French anthropologist Louis Dumont (who conducted fieldwork in the same area in the
late 1940s) that the practice of caste exclusion had ceased among this sub-caste at the end
of the 19th century. As I studied these village judicial archives, I became curious as to
whether these cases, or similar ones, had left the village settings to find a new forum and
eventually a different outcome in official courts of law. My initial intuition—that it was
highly unlikely that, at the turn of the century, villagers from these remote areas, who
had neither the know-how nor the economic capital, would make it to court—was correct.
However, though “my” villagers were absent from caste-excommunication court cases,
other Indian subjects of the British Crown were not.
8 This led to yet another revelation of some sort as my initial readings on the topic led me
to  think  otherwise.  Indeed  in  the  rather  barren  field  of  the  literature  on  caste
excommunication, K. Gnanambal stands out as the author of a significant study on the
relationship between religious institutions and caste panchayats. In his detailed study of
the judicial role held by several mutts of South India (Sringeri, Kumbakonam, Thanjavur,
Chitradurga) Gnanambal states most assuredly that, both pre- and post- Independence,
caste disputes were “not taken to the civil court or criminal court for adjudication; nor
[did]  individual  members  approach  the  latter  to  invalidate  the  decisions  of  the
panchayats” but that instead it was “the religious institutions [which] act[ed] as advisory
bodies as well as the appellate authorities” (Gnanambal 1973:203). As I was discovering,
his statement is entirely inaccurate,  whether concerning present-day Tamil Nadu, his
period  of  study,  or  prior  periods.  Indeed,  cases  both  civil  and  criminal,  concerning
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litigations  over  the breach of  kin-caste  rules,  have never  ceased to come before the
courts, throughout the 19th and 20th century and into the 21st century. With regard to the
highest caste sanction,  that of  excommunication,  High Courts have recorded cases as
early as 1863,7 and the most recent dates from September 2016.8 However, it seems that,
throughout this whole period, most cases went largely unnoticed and were set apart from
public debate and changes in legislature.9
9 At the outset of reading the court judgments, I had many questions I was hoping to find
answers to: who is excommunicating whom; what was the caste of the complainants and
defendants;  what  sanctions,  if  any,  were  applied  by the  colonial  court  against  those
pronouncing  “the  highest  caste  sanction”;  what,  damages,  if  any,  were  awarded  to
excommunicated  individuals;  if  damages  were  awarded,  on  what  grounds  were  they
awarded; were the courts treating such cases as a religious or secular question; were the
judgments  steeped  in  sastric  references;  what  kind  of  legal  considerations  were
entertained by the judges; which Acts, Bills, sections of the Penal Code were used in the
judgments?
10 This contribution is  part  of  a  larger investigation I  have recently engaged in on the
phenomena of out-casting among Hindus in South India. The core of my research focuses
on present and past practices of social death in villages of the Madurai district and relies
on fieldwork, village records of caste panchayats as well as recent court documentation.
The present stands to a certain extent apart from the main focus of my work as it is set,
far  from the  social  fabric  of  Tamil  rural  society  of  south-central  Tamil  Nadu (lower
dominant  castes),  among  British  legislators  and  Brahmin  judges.  Indeed,  in  this
contribution, I seek to unravel the legal trajectory of caste exclusion in the colonial court
by examining the occurrence, extent and content (legal and social) of these litigations. I
have  focused my investigation on the  cases  brought  to  the  Madras  High Court,  and
address only cases amongst Hindus since my research concerns practices of exclusion
amongst so-called dominant backward castes. However, though the majority of litigations
involve Hindus, litigations involving Muslims, Christians, Zoroastrians and Jews have also
occurred during the period under study. Before directly addressing the issue of caste
exclusion in the colonial court, I begin by examining the legal status of caste, as a body,
under British rule. Caste exclusion being one kind of punitive sanction, among a range of
other sanctions applied in situations of a severe breach in kin-caste rules, it is necessary
to examine what understanding was arrived at regarding these rules and which legal
measures  were  taken.  I  then  explore  the occurrence  of  suits  involving  caste
excommunication and present the main features of some twelve cases to get an overall
sense of the nature of the litigations involving excommunication, the outcomes, the social
profile of those involved. Finally, I delve more deeply into a handful of cases to assess the
grievances of the (excommunicated) complainants and the strategies of the defendants,
to identify the legal  provisions invoked both by complainants and defendants and to
unravel  the  reasoning  of  the  judges  caught  between  considerations  of  promoting
individual civil rights while not infringing on caste social rights.
 
Caste, a judicable body? Kin-caste rules and Anglo
Indian law
11 Kin-caste  rules  govern(ed)  an  important  number  of  social,  economic  and  religious
transactions and relations between members of the same birth group (family, lineage,
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sub-caste, caste) as well as the nature of the permissible interactions outside the birth
group (generally in terms of bonds of commensality and connubiality). These rules loom
(ed)  large over most  facets  of  private and public  life  (marriage,  profession,  mobility,
inheritance, etc.) and infractions came under the jurisdiction of a panchayat, a headman
or a guru, depending on the structure of the sub-caste concerned. During the colonial
period, kin-caste rules came to be acknowledged under the vast and amorphous category
of “customs.” From our vantage point in the 21st century, we can easily find that during
the colonial period, enquiries into caste customs—though they resulted in voluminous
publications in journals, census-reports, gazetteers and hand-books10—were particularly
fragmentary and incomplete regarding the enquiries into judicial customs or, as they
phrased it, “customary laws.” That sacred texts detailing the dharma of the twice born
castes largely superseded the very diverse and discrete kin-caste rules in the colonial
courts is a well-documented chapter of Indian history (Derrett 1968).11 However, though
it  is  certainly  true  that  custom was  neglected,  the picture  is  far  more nuanced and
complex, showing important variations between the Presidencies.
12 In order to grasp the prevalent views on the treatment of kin-caste rules in the courts of
the Crown,  to  capture a  more “hands-on” view of  the judicial  treatment  of  caste  in
general and of caste exclusion in particular, I have relied less on the scholarly histories of
Anglo-Indian law of the early 20th century and more on publications by legal practitioners
of this critical period. These works were used in two directions. On one hand, they are a
good source for tracking down court cases from the 19th century and on the other they
provide first-hand insight into the complexities of legal reasoning on and around castes
as judicable bodies during this period. One such work, written by the advocate Sripati
Roy, is entitled Customs and Customary Law in British India. This volume, published in 1911
(Tagore Law lectures of 190812), runs up to nearly 600 pages, covering in its 18 chapters a
broad range of topics and referring to no less than 1,500 cases. In his introduction, Roy
sets out to explain to his readers what is understood by “custom” as distinct from “Law,”
how to distinguish “custom and “usage,” describes the differing opinions of Austin and
Maine as to when a “custom” becomes “Law” and the divergence between the analytical
school  (for  example  Maine,  Hale,  Blackstone)  and  the  historical  school  (for  example
Hobbes, Bentham, Austin) regarding what should be considered “customary law.” The
author  disagrees  with  Austin’s  definition  of  customary  law as  being  a  “positive  law
fashioned by judicial legislation upon pre-existing customs” (Austin’s Juris., Vol. I, p. 148,
cited in Roy [1911:11]). His segregation of topics (chapters) is somewhat confusing but
reflects the immense complexities the courts had to deal with in administering their
different subjects.  Indeed, in Roy’s volume customs are sometimes dealt with along a
religious divide (Hindu, Buddhist and Mohamedan customs), sometimes along regional
variations  (customs  from  Malabar  and  Punjab),  but  also  according  to  precise  topics
(customs related to tenancy, trade, agency). The largest part of his attention is devoted to
“Hindu customs” and the most intricate topics have a whole chapter devoted to each of
them: adoption, impartibility, inheritance, marriage and divorce, religious endowments.
Sripati Roy comes to the topic of caste customs quite rapidly, straight after the second
chapter on “Local Customs“ (chapter 2) and just before the set of five chapters all devoted
to “Hindu customs” (chapters 4 to 8). It is by comparison rather slim, running a mere 18
pages. Once past the usual litany beginning with the arya/dasya divide turning into four
varnas leading to a multitude of “mixed up castes” (Roy 1911:103), the reader learns that
this led to the “growth of a body of rules for the guidance and the preservation of the
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community  and  these  rules  have  at  last  crystallized  into  usages  and  customs”  (Roy
1911:104). Roy’s first practical remark is that despite great variations from one caste to
another,  some general  matters  are  found uniformly across  all  castes.  The matter  he
chooses to showcase is that of “expulsion from caste.” Though Sripati Roy introduces his
readers briefly to the statute surrounding the legal treatment of caste, he does not afford
it much time or consideration regarding its complexities but instead, as befits Common
Law,  relies  on  judicial  precedent  to  expose  the  right  course  of  action  for  specific
situations. Besides his interest in excommunication, his attention is also devoted to the
thorny issue of widow re-marriage, where he compares the practices of different castes
(Maravar,  Aheer,  Lingayat)  and then moves on to a series of  succinct descriptions of
various “customs”:  female succession among the Cumbala Tottier,  divorce among the
Tirunelvelli potters, disinheritance among the Reddis, etc. He finishes on a brief note
leading back to the issue of caste membership, that of the caste status of illegitimate
children.
13 Around the same time as Roy’s lengthy investigation into customs, a shorter work was
published by L.T. Kikani, a pleader, which affords us a clearer view of the extent to which
caste was or was not considered a judicable body. Kikani’s publication, entitled Caste in
Courts or Rights and Powers of Castes in Social and Religious Matters as Recognised by Indian
Courts examines some 230 cases from the High Courts of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta.
14 His investigation is organized around seven chapters which devote much more attention
than Sripati Roy did to the judicial status of caste: an introduction to the definition of
“caste” and what are considered “caste questions”; a description of the “jurisdiction of
caste” which reminds the 21st century reader that a century ago the legal conception of
caste was radically different from what it was to become less than four decades later
(chapter 2); a detailed investigation into the complex issue of which suits can, and which
cannot, be cognizable by a civil court (chapters 3 and 4 run over a hundred pages), he
then  examines  suits  regarding  different  aspects  of  movable  and  immovable  caste
property,  that  is  conflicts  over  possession,  use,  management,  recovery  and rights  to
inspect documents and accounts relating to caste properties (chapter 5), and in his final
two chapters,  he  turns  to  caste  excommunication and more  specifically  the  issue  of
defamation as well as distinguishing between civil and criminal proceedings (chapters 6
and 7).
15 As far as I have been able to ascertain, the most important and lasting legislation having
influenced the legal trajectory of caste in colonial courts dates back to 1827. Section 21 of
Regulation II of the Elphinstone Code13 excluded caste questions from the cognizance of
civil courts. In essence, this meant that distinct castes were perceived as self-governing
bodies and thereby entitled to be internally governed according to their own rules. This
meant that “on most matters the caste could make, modify, and revoke its rules. The
majority, or the established authorities within the caste, could not be overruled by the
civil courts on these “caste questions.” Caste questions are said to include all matters
affecting the internal autonomy and social relations of a caste” (Galanter 1968:308). This
regulation of 1827, which set in stone the principle of non-cognizance of caste matters,
was upheld again in 1862 in a special appeal to the Bombay High Court (No. 39) and was
by and large endorsed in the three Presidencies throughout colonial rule, as attested by
the  court  cases  consulted  during  this  research.14 Nonetheless,  the  principle  of  non-
cognizance  of  caste  questions  did  not  keep  caste  matters  out  of  the  courts.  Indeed,
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, claims regarding various caste issues were put to
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the  colonial  courts.  There  were,  as  several  historians  have  described,  a  tremendous
number  of  cases  regarding  caste  ranking  and  caste  titles  which  flooded  the  courts
following the introduction of varna as a category of social classification in the decennial
census  in  1901.15 However,  these  litigations  did  not  concern  questions  of  internal
management of caste affairs but new forms of intra-caste competition.16
16 The task of distinguishing which matters infringed on the principle of the autonomy of
caste from those over which civil or criminal courts had de facto jurisdiction was far from
straightforward.  On principle,  matters  strictly  regarding the internal  management of
caste affairs were those concerning “various caste offices, entitlement to receive certain
privileges and precedence” (Roy 1911:108), “claims of rival factions of the same caste to
common  caste  property,  caste  leadership,  requiring  voluntary  offerings,  honors  and
presents  to  specific  caste  members,  officiate  as  a  priest,  compulsory  invitation  to
dinners”  (Kikani  1912:ii)  as  well  as  claims  regarding  caste  excommunications.  As
mentioned earlier, Kikani devotes an entire chapter to “Suits relating to caste questions
not cognizable by Civil Courts” (chapter 3) followed by another chapter exploring “Suits
of civil nature” (chapter 4), that is those which are recognized by the courts. On the basis
of a large number of court cases, he identifies nine different scenarios of recurring non-
cognizable and cognizable suits, which I have assembled in tables 1 and 2:
Cognizable caste questions
Religious office to which a fixed fee is attached
Hereditary rights to an office to which no fixed fee is attached
Rights of exclusive worship 
Alienation of hereditary office 
Property in idol worship 
Rights of burial 
Power of a caste to remove the trustee of its charitable trust
Right to carry religious procession in public streets
Right to property in a mosque
 
Table 1: Caste-related cognizable suits (compiled from Kikani [1912] chapters 3 and 4)
Non-cognizable caste questions
Compulsory invitations to dinner
Caste offices to which no fixed fee is attached
Religious rites and ceremonies 
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Agreements pertaining to social and religious matters 
Caste questions if the decree passed cannot be executed 
Principal question is a caste question and subsidiary question is of civil nature
Mere dignities and honors
Rival faction-claims to common caste property
Caste customs over which the spiritual leader of the caste has jurisdiction 
 
Table 2: Caste-related non-cognizable suits (compiled from Kikani [1912] chapters 3 and 4)
17 The question whether the court “by taking cognizance of the matter in dispute would or
would not be interfering with the autonomy of the caste … and the task of ascertaining
what is or what is not a caste question has been very often proved to be a question of
great  difficulty”  (Kikani  1912:ii).  Indeed,  the  interpenetration of  “caste”  within most
spheres of social and religious life made the legal distinction between social (i.e. caste)
and  civil  rather  mind-boggling,  as  can  be  clearly  verified  in  the  pleader’s  following
comment:
where a caste question is not the principal question, but only a subsidiary question,
and the principal  question is  of  civil  nature,  and further the principal  question
which is of civil nature, cannot be determined without deciding upon the caste-
question, the civil court will in such cases decide upon the caste question (Kikani:9).
18 So in effect, the courts took on a great many cases involving litigations of caste questions.
However, as we will see in the case studies, the judges were by and large very reluctant to
interfere in caste matters per se and when they did, it was generally not with regard to
the immediate matters at stake but with corollary issues of procedure and authority. As
one of the most significant scholars on contemporary Indian legal history puts it: the
“courts were wary about the extent of intervention and set up standards that emphasized
procedural rather than substantive supervision. The courts would entertain claims only
if: (1) the decision of a caste tribunal had not been arrived at bona fide; (2) the decision
was taken under mistaken belief; (3) the decision was actually contrary to the rules or
usage of the caste; or (4) that is was contrary to natural justice.” (Galanter 1966:309)
 
Lex non scripta? Social rights vs Civil Rights
19 While poring through publications on law and customs, either dating from the colonial
period or concerned with it, I was quite startled to find that the phenomenon of caste
excommunication did not at all capture the imagination or the attention of orientalists,
administrators and legal practitioners the way other violent, coercive or degrading social
practices did (such as sati, hook-swinging, untouchables barred from entering temples,
etc.), and which led to a number of debates among jurists and administrators as well as to
specific  legislations  on  these  practices.  This  is  all  the  more  surprising  as  the  first
descriptions of  acts  causing the “loss  of  caste” (bahishkāra)  are found in the earliest
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available sources of Hindu legal texts, the Dharmasūtras,17 which were produced some
2000 to 2500 years ago.
20 With what we know of the preponderant number of Brahmins in all ranks of the colonial
administration, their overwhelming presence in the ranks of the colonial judiciary18 and
the  central  importance  given  to  the  Sastras  both  under  Company  rule  and  then
throughout colonial rule,19 I wondered whether this absence of reference to the sastric
sources on excommunication might be put on the account of a late translation of the
texts  concerned  with  bahishkāra (literally  “falling  from  one’s  caste”).  However  the
explanation does not lie there since, as Olivelle indicates in his recent (re)translation of
the  Dharmasutras:  “In  1879  George  Buhler  published  his  English  translation  of  the
Dharmasutras of Apastamba and Gautama under the title The Sacred Laws of the Aryas as
the second volume of the Sacred Books of the East edited by Max Muller. Three years later
he brought out the translations of Vasistha and Baudhayana, and in 1886 he published the
translation of the law book of Manu (Manu Smrti) in the same series” (Olivelle 1999).
Apastamba, Gautama and Baudhyana all wrote, in different ways, about bahishkāra and
very specifically on the types of breaches in kin-caste rules which lead to bahishkāra (loss
of caste).
21 Though the British and later Indian jurists did not display any specific interest in the
causes  of  excommunication,  they  were  nonetheless  aware  of  the  devastating
consequences of the loss of caste. The literature on excommunication being extremely
slim, it is not possible to rely on secondary material to provide the reader, or myself for
that  matter,  with  even  a  brief  overview  of  the  pre-Mutiny  legal  treatment  of
excommunication  under  Company  rule.20 That  litigations  arose  is  certain  and  that
primary data is somewhere out there for scrutiny is probable, as an excruciatingly short
reference made by Kikani suggests that there had indeed been suits for “the restoration
of caste” since the introduction of the Cornwallis Code (1793), which is best known for the
decree of permanent settlement. The pleader notes that “in the Bengal Presidency suits
for the restoration to caste were made expressly cognizable by Bengal regulation III of
1793 [the Cornwallis Code],21 and were often taken cognizance of by ordinary Courts”
(Kikani 1912:iii).22 We can also gather that Regulations were not uniform throughout the
three Presidencies as for example—in contrast to the Bengal Presidency—in the Bombay
Presidency, unless the excommunication arose through an illegal act perpetrated by the
excommunicating party, the court would not have jurisdiction over the matter.23
22 In 1850, an important piece of legislation was passed which curbed to a certain extent the
consequences of caste excommunication and thereby partly infringed upon the rights of
castes  to  determine  the  nature  and  extent  of  caste  sanctions.24 Since  the  “Caste
Disabilities Removal Act” or “Freedom of Religion Act” (Act XXI of 1850) was passed,
“mere loss of caste does not operate as a disqualification of a person’s civil rights” (Roy
1911:111).  In  practice  it  appears  that  the  Act  was  passed  mainly  to  guarantee  that
converts  and  outcasts  be  protected  as  to  their  rights  to  hold,  manage  and  inherit
property. This Act was the first legislation of its kind that put the individual’s civil rights
above  the  caste’s  social  rights  and  as  such  constitutes  the  early  foundation  of  the
destitution of the jurisdiction of caste over its members. However, as we will see through
the case studies in the final part of this contribution, it was fairly inconsequential, or at
least very rarely invoked in the litigations which occurred between 1860 and 1950.
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Caste exclusion through the lens of the Madras High
Court.
23 The introduction of the courts of the East India Company, followed by those of the British
Crown, opened new judicial arenas with new sets of rules, which could be used to extend
a conflict, overturn a judgment and seek previously nonexistent compensations.25 The
starting  point  of  this  investigation,  the  establishment  of  Direct  Rule  (following  the
Mutiny or first war of Independence), corresponds not only to a time of great change in
the administrative landscape of colonized India but also to a fundamental change in its
judicial  landscape  with  the  establishment,  in  1862,  of  three  High  Courts  in  Madras,
Calcutta and Bombay.26
24 My inquiry into the treatment of caste exclusion by the colonial High Courts is focused on
my region of study, South India, which came under the administration of the Madras
Presidency during the colonial period. It is interesting to note that the jurisdiction of the
Madras High Court during colonial rule encompassed the present day jurisdictions of the
Kerala High Court, the Andhra High Court and the Karnataka High Court.
25 Assessing the exact number of suits related to caste exclusion which were brought before
the colonial  courts  is  an extremely difficult  task which was not  attempted here.  My
methodology for identifying, locating and retrieving cases relied on a variety of points of
entry. The court cases referenced by Roy (1911) and especially Kikani (1912), but also later
studies such as Lingat (1967),  yielded a good number of cases to be tracked down. A
search through a number of volumes accessible,  partly or fully,  online of the Madras
Series of the Indian Law Reports and the Madras Law Reporter also provided further cases
directly pertaining to caste exclusion but also unrelated cases where the loss of caste is
evoked in a rhetorical or comparative manner to the main case at stake.27 Two of the
online case search engines, India Kanoon and Legal Crystal were also used to retrieve
cases cited by the authors mentioned above but also to identify previously un-cited cases.
The severance of an individual from his or her birth group has, as noted in footnote (2),
been variously labelled in the British courts and literature devoted to this phenomenon.
Therefore  searching for  its  occurrences  entailed  tracking down cases  evoking  “caste
excommunication,”  “loss  of  caste,”  “caste  suspension,”  “caste  expulsion,”  “caste
exclusion” and “outcasting.”28 The most common label found during the colonial period is
the Christian sounding “excommunication” with associated phrasing such as “no longer
in communion with.” It would be fascinating to learn how the term excommunication
came  to  be  used  as  an  English  “translation”  of  “exclusion  from  the  birth  group,”
unfortunately no such study exists to date. Had the British judges delved into the sastric
references pertaining to this matter, which—as we will confirm below—they did not, they
would have encountered the Sanskrit  term bahishkāra.  Regrettably,  not  a single  case
offers the reader a transcription of the vernacular term(s) (whether in Telugu, Tamil,
Malayalam or Kannada) used by the protagonists to designate this event in their native
tongue.
26 With the above mentioned parameters and constraints taken into account, I was able to
identify 44 cases and to access 32 of them. Considering the important case flow in the
Madras High Court, these numbers appear rather derisory.29 However, a very important
point to take into consideration is that the High Courts would only consider appeals from
lower courts and therefore these figures are not representative of the number of cases
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disposed of  before the first  court  of  law approached for such litigations,  the District
Munsif Court. It is therefore a significant blind spot in our appreciation of the volume, or
lack of litigations regarding caste exclusions as we cannot evaluate the number of cases
which were accepted, the number which were dismissed, and the number which were
withdrawn  or  abandoned.  Nor  can  we  assess the  same  for  those  cases  the  litigants
(whether complainant or defendant) chose to appeal to the Subordinate Judge’s Court and
which did not reach the High Court.
27 It is quite straightforward to posit that seeing a case through the three levels of the
colonial judiciary must have taken a significant amount of financial and social capital.
The four case studies presented further will amply demonstrate this fact.
28 Restricting my data to cases brought before High Courts also entails missing part of the
story, as I have not had access to the cases prior their hearing, as appeals, in the High
Courts. However, this gap in the data is largely mitigated by the fact that, in numerous
cases,  the past judgments in the subordinate courts are not only described but often
quoted at length.
29 For lack of space, all cases retrieved could not be presented here. However, over a third of
the cases are listed below in table 3,  with,  in addition to their  date,  name and case
reference, seven other defining criteria for each case, allowing the reader to appreciate to
some  extent  their  shape  and  texture:  the  object  of  the  suit,  the  cause  of  the
excommunication, the outcome of the suit, the judges, the geographical location of the
excommunication (with the present day state the locality corresponds to), the religion of
the protagonists as well as the castes of the complainant(s) and the defendant(s). The
method  employed  for  selecting  the  cases  presented  below  follows  firstly  a
straightforward  principle  of  representing  each  decade  with  one  or  two  cases.  As
mentioned in the introduction, I had already proceeded to a selection of cases pertaining
only to Hindus. However, as a number of cases reveal legal complexities of conversion, I
have  included here  one  case  reflecting  this  state  of  affairs  (Christian converts).  The
further process of selection consisted in representing as widely as possible the different
objects of the suits and the cause of excommunication along with a representation of the
different castes engaged in these litigations.
Date Case
Object  of  the  suit  /  cause  /  outcome /
judges
Location  /  Religion
/ Caste
1883




ILR 6 Mad 381
Object: Suit  for  unlawful
excommunication
Cause: Complainant supporting widow re-
marriage
Outcome:  Respondent  charged  under
section  500  (defamation):  200  rupees  fine
or 1 month imprisonment.








High  priest  Smarta
sect
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1894




ILR 17 Mad 222
Object: Suit  for  unlawful
excommunication
Cause: Defiance  of  the  caste  guru  and
associating with excommunicated people
Outcome: Suit dismissed with costs








(subcaste  guru  +
assistant)
1895
Kasim  Saiba  and
Ors.  v.  Sudhindra
Thirtha Swami
judgment
ILR 18 Mad 359
Object: Suit  for recovery of  funds from a
mortgage bond
Cause:  Excommunicated  swami  (living  in
adultery  with  a  women  &  illegitimate
child)  therefore  not  entitled  to  have
borrowed/lent money
Outcome: Suit dismissed with costs




Son  of  the  former
swami of Puttige Mutt
Respondant(s):








Object: Suit for route of an idol procession
Cause: Not a case of excommunication but
a discussion of upholding the principle of
caste  autonomy  including
excommunication.
Outcome: Suit dismissed with costs
















Kuppusami  Chetty  v.
Dorasami  Chetty
(1912) M.W.N. 1220
Object: Suit  for false  excommunication &
defamation
Cause: The complainant was accused of an
improper  marriage  of  his  daughter  (low)
and  “falsely”  pronounced
excommunicated  by  the  defendant.
Discussion  over  the  implication  of
prayaschittam (purification)
Outcome: Suit remanded for disposal
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Object: Suit for defamation
Cause:  Complainant  is  turned  away  from
the  house  of  the  defendant  for  a
celebration and told he was “not fit” as he
took  a  meal  at  a  widow  remarriage.
Though not  pronounced out  of  caste,  the
complainant states the effects are identical











Nair v. M. Achutha
Menon
Judgment
28 MLJ 310 
Object: Suit for defamation
Cause:  Charges  of  adultery  of  a  woman
leading  to  the  excommunication  of  the
complainant and several others
Outcome: Suit dismissed with costs
Judge(s): Ayling & Tyabji












Object: Suit  for  the  nullity  of  a  marriage
due to bigamy
Cause: Excommunicated Christian woman
marries  a  converted  man  who  was
previously married to a Hindu woman. The
husband  claimed  she  had  no  right  under
the  Indian  Divorce  Act  because  she  was
excommunicated.
Outcome: Nullity confirmed with costs















Object: Suit for defamation
Cause:  Complainants  convicted  of
defamation  in  a  suit over  an
excommunication.  Two  rival  caste
tribunals disagreeing on whether travel to
England  (i.e.  “crossing  the  black  water”)
should entail excommunication
Outcome:  Convictions  and  sentences  of
the Lower courts reversed. Fine, if paid, to
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1931
A.D.  Narayana  Sah




IndCas  422,  (1932)
62 MLJ 608
Object: Suit  for  unlawful
excommunication & defamation
Cause:  The  complainants  had
excommunicated  the  respondent  (dead)
for alleged “unchastity” and she obtained
2000 rupees of damages in the subordinate
court which the complainants contested in
this appeal.
Outcome:  Appeal  dismissed  with  costs  of
500  rupees.  The  compensation  for
defamation is upheld though the unlawful

















Object: Suit for inheritance of property
Cause:  The  complainant  was  adopted  by
his  uncle  (the  defendant’s  father).  The
respondent  claims  that  his  adoption  was
invalid  (and  therefore  that  he  cannot
inherit)  as  his  mother  was
excommunicated  for  adultery,  which  the
complainant denies.
Outcome:  Adultery  is  recognized  but
excommunication  declared  false  entitling










and Ors. v. Ellappa
Goundan
Order
AIR 1950 Mad 409
Object: Suit  for  unlawful
excommunication
Cause:  The  complainants,  a  group  of
panchayattars,  had  excommunicated  the
respondent for not expulsing his daughter
who was allegedly having an affair with an
Adi-dravida (dalit).
Outcome:  Petition  dismissed  on  the











Table 3: Sample of case of excommunication 1883–1949
30 As we can see from table (3), the nature of many of the infractions having led to caste
excommunication is related to rather orthodox religious observances (widow-remarriage,
crossing the “black water,” obedience to a caste guru), matters which were a subject of
debate and reform at the time. Further, marital issues, whether in the form of adultery or
so-called improper alliances (lower lineages,  widows)  are largely present in the suits
whether  as  a  direct  cause  of  infraction  or  as  a  corollary  factor  to  the  suit.  Several
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recurrent patterns in the legal reasoning of the judges emerge from the judgment and
therefore the outcome of most of the suits. These will be identified and described in the
detailed  case  studies  presented  below.  The  four  cases  examined  were  selected  as
significantly representative of the court’s approaches and reasoning of the role of Law in
cases of caste exclusion. The first case study is examined at length as it was to become the
most cited case during the colonial period with regard to loss of caste membership. It sets
out  that  procedural  and jurisprudential  criteria  supersede  both fact  finding  and the
sympathies of the judges. It places at the heart of the question of the legal validity of a
caste exclusion an enquiry into the authority to pronounce it. We will see that, as time
goes by, the judges become increasingly frustrated with the causes of caste exclusion:
there will be increased attention given to the protection of the civil rights of outcast
individuals, and therefore to the damages accorded; but nonetheless the judges still find
themselves bound to procedural and jurisprudential reasoning. In the fourth and final
case studied, we will see that many factual and social parameters change radically but
despite  this—as  well  as  the  fact  that  India  had  become  independent—although  its
Constitution was not  yet  in place (the judgment was delivered in 1949)—the guiding
principle established over seventy years before prevailed.
 
The Queen v. Sri Vidya Sankara Narasinha Bharathi
Guruswamulu (Case study 1)
31 The earliest case I was able to consult occurred some twenty years after the opening of
the High Court, in 1883 to be precise.30 This case, The Queen v. Sri Vidya Sankara Narasinha
Bharathi Guruswamulu,31 puts the reader right at the heart of the debates over what should
and should not constitute so-called “Hindu law,” debates which were caught in the cross-
fire of the war raging between Hindu reformists and the more conservative or orthodox
Hindus. The setting for the events, which unfolded between March and December 1881, is
a town in the Northern Circars, Rajahmundry, on the banks of the Godavari River, now an
important city of  Andhra Pradesh half  way between Vijayawada and Visakhapatnam.
There had been meetings and intense debates in Rajahmundry as to whether widow re-
marriages were not in fact permitted by the Sastras. The reformists, who were headed by
a Virasalingam (a Brahmin), were numerically small in comparison with the orthodox
party. Though they sought the approval of the guru regarding the issue of widow re-
marriage, their meetings and petitions went unheeded. In December 1881, two weddings
involving Brahmin widows were celebrated in Virasalingam’s house.32 Following these
events,  Atmuri  Lakshmi  Narasimha,  the  complainant,  was  notified  by  a  postcard  he
received  by  mail  that  he  was  excommunicated  by  the  defendant,  Sri  Vidya  Sankara
Narasinha  Bharathi  Guruswamulu  (hereafter  the  “guru”), for  taking  part  in  the
celebration of  widow  re-marriages.  The  guru’s  decision  was  then  also  circulated  in
writing to a vast number of people in the locality.
32 Both men opposed in this suit were of rather high social standing as one was a district
Munsif (the complainant) and, the other, a high priest (the respondent). On the 11th of
January 1882, the guru was charged under sections five sections of the Indian Penal Code
(1860):
• section 499: defamation;
• section 500: punishment for defamation (up to 2 years),33
• section 503: criminal intimidation;
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• section 506: punishment for criminal intimidation (up to 7 years);
• section 508: acts caused by inducing [a] person to believe that he will be rendered an object
of the Divine displeasure.
33 It is significant to note here that no section of the Penal Code is devoted to the question at
stake but that instead it has to be addressed “sideways” through the possible prejudices
caused  by  exclusion  from  the  birth  group:  defamation,  intimidation  and  the  rather
interesting section 508 of inducing belief of causing divine displeasure (here referring to
the religious repercussions of excommunication).
34 The  judges  addressed  a  number  of  questions  to  be  elucidated  in  order  to  establish
whether the case was really cognizable by the court or whether it should be dismissed as
strictly  an  internal  caste  matter.  The  first  question  to  be  decided  was  whether  the
respondent  was  indeed the  complainant’s  guru,  therefore  whether  the  guru had the
rightful  jurisdiction to  hand down a  caste  sanction.  From the very beginning of  the
litigation, A.L. Narasimham claimed that, as a Visishta Advaita (vaishnavite), he was not
to be under the jurisdiction of the guru. The Joint Magistrate in Godavari (where this suit
was tried before reaching the Madras High Court) found otherwise and the two bench
judges of the Madras High Court were of the same opinion. Determining membership in a
sect or a caste was not a simple matter. The judgment reflects the eminent Indian judge
Muttusami Ayyar’s knowledge of Hindu law. He expounds on the history of dualistic and
non-dualistic philosophy. He then sets out to explain, “from the evidence found in this
case,” the sociological  specificities of  sectarian affiliations in the Northern Circars.  It
appears that most Komatis—the caste of A.L.  Narasimham—were Saivites,  though one
subcaste—the  Trivarnikulu—were  rigid  Vaishnavites  and  therefore  not  under  the
jurisdiction  of  the  guru.  The  investigation  into  the  sectarian  membership  of  A.L.
Narasimham  was  quite  thorough  and  distinguished  between  what  he  professed  as
doctrine  and  which  practices  of  connubiality,  commensality  and  worship  were
entertained  both  by  himself  and  his  relatives.  The  judgment  details  the  amounts  of
donations given respectively to Smarta Brahmins and Advaiti Brahmins during funerals;
whom his children married; which guru was recognized by his relatives, by his family
priest and by his own guru at Pantapad; the building by his Vaishavite grandfather of a
Siva temple, etc. These different pieces of evidence, described in order to establish A.L.
Narasimham  effective sectarian  membership,  present  somewhat  blurred  boundaries
between  devotional  practices  and  caste  membership.  In  fine  the  judges  make  their
decision as follows:
The whole evidence in the case conveys the impression that the complainant and
his  ancestors  were  originally  Smartas,  both  in  doctrine  and  ritual,  and
acknowledged  the  respondent  and  his  predecessors  as  their  spiritual  superiors;
that, though they since changed their doctrine as to the unity of soul and God, and
adopted  some  Vaishnava  practices,  still  they  retained  their  old  Smarta  ritual,
intermarried,  and  ate  with  Smartas  only,  and  continued  to  acknowledge  the
respondent as their guru. This view is further confirmed by the fact that the guru at
Pantapad, whom the complainant acknowledges to be his spiritual superior, is a
disciple of the respondent. We must therefore take it upon the evidence, for the
purposes of this case, that the respondent is the complainant’s spiritual superior or
guru (The Queen v. Sri Vidya Sankara Narasinha Bharathi Guruswamulu 1883).
Hence, the guru’s jurisdiction over A.L. Narasimham was established, giving the former
authority to expel the latter from his caste, thereby making his excommunication lawful
and the case non-cognizable by the civil courts.
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35 Though A.L. Narasimham lost his argument regarding the non-jurisdiction of the guru,
his original suit charged the guru with defamation (section 499 and 500), criminal
intimidation  (section  503  and  506)  and  causing  of  divine  displeasure  (section  508).
Therefore, the second question examined by the two judges was whether the guru “ought
to have been convicted either of criminal intimidation, or of criminal threat to render the
complainant  an  object  of  divine  displeasure,  or  of  defamation?”  However,  before
attending to this question,  the judges pondered over the cause of  A.L.  Narasimham’s
excommunication,  that  is  his  support  for  a  reform  of  Hindu  Law  regarding  the
prohibition of widow remarriage. Interestingly, though the judgment states clearly that
the court is not at liberty to discuss the merits, or lack thereof of widow remarriage, a
rather detailed and scholarly discussion is nonetheless given assessing the issue of the
prohibition of widow remarriage in classical sources of Hindu Law (relying on authors
such  as  Apastamba  and  Gautama,  the  texts  of  Dayabagha  and  Smriti  Chandrika).
Moreover,  the  judgment  actually  concludes  that  it  is  contrary  to  “usage”  amongst
Brahmins (Muttusami Ayyar,  the Indian judge in this case,  is himself  a Brahmin) but
reiterates that such a matter is beyond the jurisdiction of the court. A striking aspect of
this case is that despite the extent of the consideration given to the sources of classical
Hindu Law, to the painstakingly complex assessment of what should come under general
custom, particular custom, usage, etc., the judges never cite nor even allude to sastric
sources on excommunication. This fact is, as noted earlier, common to every single case I
have consulted during this study.
36 Once the non-cognizable sastric considerations are put to the test, the judgment returns
to the second question and brushes it off in one stroke. The charges under section 503,
506 and 508 simply cannot be sustained as it is decided that a “hardship arising from a
conventional  punishment,  which  a  spiritual  superior,  acting  in  the  exercise  of  his
authority as regulated by the custom of the caste, is competent to inflict” can neither be
characterized as criminal intimidation nor as inducing as person to believe he will be the
object  of  divine  displeasure.  Nonetheless,  throughout  this  rather  eloquent  judgment
(which runs nearly 10 pages), the personal musing of the judges are offered up to the
readers  who can learn that  “it  may be a  matter  of  regret  that  there should be this
spiritual tyranny and oppression, but if it is consistent with the usage of the caste of
which the complainant claims to be a member, and if it is not expressly forbidden by law,
we are not at liberty to treat it as a criminal offence.”
37 Two  charges  for  defamation  (section  499  and  500)  were  the  last  to  be  scrutinized.
Explanation III of section 499 states that “any imputation, which directly or indirectly,
lowers in the estimation of others the character of a person in respect to his caste, is
defamatory.” Since two exhibits produced during the trial (the postcard sent by mail to
the complainant and the circular sent to many residents of Rajahmundry) state of A.L.
Narasimham  is  excommunicated,  they  are  prima  facie  defamatory.  Exhibit  A,  the
postcard, read as follows:
You have done a sinful act by aiding widow-marriage and thereby made yourself an
object of divine displeasure. For this I punish you in the mode permitted by the
usage of our caste. I also mention to you how in my opinion you may atone for your
conduct,  and regain divine favor.  If  you follow the advice,  I  shall  withdraw the
punishment (The Queen v. Sri Vidya Sankara Narasinha Bharathi Guruswamulu 1883).
However, it was established that the guru had the privilege, as a spiritual superior, to
formulate this declaration. Nonetheless a final point remained to be considered, that of
whether any ill-will was displayed which would constitute malice in law. As the judgment
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explains, malice in law consists in the conscious violation of law to another’s prejudice
and in the specific context of this case meant deciding whether:
[T]he privilege was exercised with due care and attention, to look at the defamatory
language which was employed, and the mode of publication which was adopted,
and  to  see  whether  they  are  so  far  in  excess  of  the  privilege  as  to  indicate  a
conscious  disregard  of  the  legal  right  of  the  party  on  whose  character  the
imputation was made (The Queen v. Sri Vidya Sankara Narasinha Bharathi Guruswamulu
1883).
The language employed, though described by the judges as “strong and insulting,” was
considered within the jurisdiction of the guru. However, his shoe will finally pinch in the
post office! Exhibit A was written by the guru on a postcard and sent through the post
office to the complainant. This mode of communication was deemed “illegal and a wanton
excess of privilege.” Why is that so? The judges explained that the message was intended
for the information of the complainant alone and that by using the post office any clerk
handling  the  card  was  at  liberty  to  read  the  libelous  message.  Further,  in  a  rather
amusing remark, it was established that communicating a caste sentence through the
post office was “quite new and not sanctioned by custom” and that, consequently, the
mode of publication vitiated the guru’s privilege. Legal malice was therefore established
and the guru convicted of defamation. The guru was sentenced to a fine of two hundred
rupees or, in default, a simple imprisonment for the term of one month.
38 Besides the interesting specifics of this significant case, which as was mentioned earlier
was to become the most cited in the decades to come, two important features stand out
which run through many of the cases of excommunication during the colonial period: one
is  the question of  the authority to excommunicate and the other the prominence of
procedural considerations over fact-finding prerogatives.
39 In order to establish the lawfulness of an excommunication, meaning that it is within the
purview of the principle of caste autonomy laid down in Regulation II of the Elphinstone
Code of the Bombay Presidency but followed also in the Madras Presidency, most judges
paid great attention to the issue of nature of the judicial authority among the sub-caste
involved in the litigation. Challenging the legitimacy of the body having pronounced the
excommunication was a frequent strategy employed by excommunicated complainants in
order to bring the litigation out of the jurisdiction of the caste and into the realm of
colonial  justice.  Recognized authorities  for  matters  of  caste questions in general  and
excommunication in particular were caste headmen, caste gurus or caste panchayats. In
many of the cases studied here, the excommunication was pronounced by a caste guru. As
noted earlier, many of the infractions having caused the excommunications were related
in one way or another to rather orthodox religious observance.
40 In an interestingly complex case tried in 1909,34 the complainant,  a Chettiyar,  sued a
group of his caste fellows for defamation. I will very briefly expose a few elements of this
case here, which strongly harkens back to The Queen v. Sankara. These men had stated that
the complainant needed to perform a prayaschittam (a purification ceremony) over the
allegedly “improper and low” marriage of his daughter. He was never pronounced outcast
verbatim but he adduced that requesting him to perform prayaschittam (as well as those
coming in contact with him or his household) was tantamount to labelling him outcast
which, the complainant argued, these men had no authority to decree. The judge opined
that: 
every member of a caste is entitled to have his own views about the propriety or
otherwise  of  the  conduct  of  another  person  as  regards  real  or  supposed  caste
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customs or usages and if the defendants and certain other members of the caste
“boycott”  the  plaintiff  and  his  friends  for  what  they  considered  to  be  his
transgression of caste rules, a Civil Court has no jurisdiction to interfere (The Queen
v. Sri Vidya Sankara Narasinha Bharathi Guruswamulu 1883).
and went yet a step further with regards to the issue of purification (prayaschittam): 
this power to “boycott” implies also the power to indicate the course which the
plaintiff  and  others  who  associate  with  him  must  adopt  if  they  wish  to  purge
themselves of what was in the defendants’ eye a caste offense, and to associate with
them (The Queen v. Sri Vidya Sankara Narasinha Bharathi Guruswamulu 1883).
However he goes on to state that no “member of a caste is entitled to take the matter of
an excommunication in his own hands and pronounce someone outcast” (The Queen v. Sri
Vidya Sankara Narasinha Bharathi Guruswamulu 1883).
41 This apparent contradiction, from one paragraph to the next, reveals one of the very
difficult practical features in adjudicating an unlawful excommunication. This practical
issue was noted by L.T. Kikani in 1912 and resonates right up to the police reports and
cases of caste excommunications in the 21st century: 
the courts could not compel Hindus against their will to ask other Hindus to their
house or their entertainment. … The rule against the maintenance of suits relating
to caste rights is sometimes based on the impracticality of enforcing them (Kikani
1912:iii).
The  second  prominent  feature  in  the  case  of  The  Queen  v.  Sankara,  which  clearly
dominates  all  cases  of  excommunication  during  the  colonial  period  is  the  attention
devoted  by  the  judges  to  the  nature  of  the  procedure  having  presided  over  the
excommunication. If the procedure was shown to be bona fide, then all was well and good.
The hard facts—which are the causes or nature of  the infractions—having led to the
excommunication  were  mostly  out  of  bounds  for  the  judges  since  these,  under  the
principle of caste autonomy, were non-cognizable.35 We will see in the next case a clear
example of the centrality of procedural correctness.
 
Ganapati Bhatta v. Bharati Swami (Case study 2)
42 In 1894, Ganapati Bhatta v. Bharati Swami was a slam dunk case which clearly exemplifies
the application by the colonial courts of the principle of caste autonomy established in
1827 and the jurisdiction of caste headman over their caste fellows. The events tried in
this case took place in the spring of 1887 in South Canara.36 As in nearly all  cases of
excommunication  studied  here37 both  parties  are  of  the  same  sub-caste,  here  Havik
Brahmins. Ganapati Bhatta, the complainant, was excommunicated by Bharati Swami, his
subcaste guru on the count of “three caste offences”: (1) not visiting the caste guru and
paying a religious tax (‘kanike’)  to him;  (2)  openly expressing his  disapproval  of  the
excommunication of  other  men from the  subcaste  (for  reasons  not  described in  the
judgment)  and  promising  to  maintain  relations  (“caste  communion”)  with  them;  (3)
associating  with  the  excommunicated  men  in  defiance  of  the  “first  respondent’s
authority as chief of his sub-caste.”
43 The “provisional order of excommunication” was communicated (by means unspecified
in the judgment) the very same day it was issued (17th of May 1887) to the Brahmin
communities of Mangalore. Ganapathi Bhatta brought the matter of his excommunication
through three levels of the colonial judicial system: first the District Munsif, secondly the
Subordinate  Judge  and  finally  the  Madras  High  Court.  Bhatta  did  not  object  to  his
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excommunication on the grounds that he did not commit the three caste offenses but
that the order of excommunication was “unjust and invalid on the ground that it was
issued without notice to him and that  he suffered thereby both in his  property and
reputation” (Ganapati Bhatta v. Bharati Swami 1894).
44 He first brought his suit against the guru to the District Munsif who dismissed his case
considering that the “first respondent [the guru] was at liberty to deal with questions
relating to caste and religious usages, and that the Civil Courts ought not to interfere to
prevent first respondent from correcting caste misconduct” (Ganapati  Bhatta v.  Bharati
Swami 1894). Ganapathi Bhatta then made an appeal to the next higher authority in the
colonial judicial landscape, the Subordinate Judge. However, the latter not only approved
the  decision  taken  by  the  District  Munsif  but  further  argued  that:  “the  order  [of
excommunication] was provisional” and that the “appellant’s liability to pay kanike or
subscription or fee was a caste matter and that appellant had no right to complain, unless
the fee demanded was unreasonable or extortionate,  which it  was not in the case” (
Ganapati Bhatta v. Bharati Swami 1894).  The first argument of the Subordinate Judge
alludes  to  one  of  the  four  standard  features  of  excommunication  which  is  that
excommunication may be either temporary or permanent. This feature is prominent in
the  Dharmasutras  which  clearly  distinguish  between  primary  sins  (where  the
excommunication  is  definitive)  and  secondary  sins  (where  reintegration  is  possible
through specific rites of purification). However, as throughout all cases, no reference is
made to the classical  texts by the subordinate judge.  In all  cases where the order of
excommunication was provisional or temporary, this feature tended to be noted by the
judges as a sign of good faith and moderation on the part of the gurus or headmen.
45 Ganapathi Bhatta made his final appeal to the Madras High Court. The judgment was
passed on the 7th of February 1894, that is seven years after his excommunication. Their
decision is clearly res judicata:
The relation between appellant and first respondent is that of a member and the
ecclesiastical chief of his caste. Whether the disciple should visit his guru and make
his obeisance, whether the former should pay the latter a kanike or fee by virtue of
the spiritual  relation,  and whether the disciple  should abstain from intercourse
with  persons  already  excommunicated  by  his  guru,  are  matters  relating  to  the
autonomy  of  caste  with  which,  as  the  head  of  the  caste,  first  respondent  has
jurisdiction to deal according to recognized case custom. … The provisional nature
of  the  order  shows  that  care  was  taken to  see  that  the  punishment  by  way  of
excommunication which, as ecclesiastical chief, first respondent was competent to
inflict, was not more extensive than was necessary to enforce obedience to caste
duties. … In a matter relating to caste customs over which the ecclesiastical chief
has jurisdiction and exercises his jurisdiction with due care and in conformity to
the usage of caste, the Civil Courts cannot interfere (Ganapati Bhatta v. Bharati Swami
1894). 
Therefore, in this second appeal, Ganapathi Bhatta failed for the third time to have the
court intervene on his behalf.  The jurisdiction of the caste guru was upheld and the
autonomy of caste reaffirmed. As noted by Sripati Roy “the condemned person has no
remedy even in Courts of Justice, unless the decisions were shown to be not bona fide”
(Kikani 1912:104).
46 In this final statement, the judge(s) put his finger, albeit fleetingly, on a very prominent
feature  of  caste  excommunication  as  I  have  observed  it  in  village  settings  both  in
contemporary practices and village records. The sanction of temporary excommunication
by panchayats in the case of  relatively minor infractions to kin-caste rules is  indeed
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extremely common. In these cases, it is used as a coercive device to impose a decision
taken by the panchayat on a recalcitrant defendant, which is precisely how the judge
describes it here: “the punishment by way of excommunication … was not more extensive
than was necessary to enforce obedience to caste duties” (Ganapati Bhatta v. Bharati Swami
1894). In the cases of the coercive purpose of excommunication in the village setting, its
extent may also vary, ranging from imposing a status of social death (all religious, social
and economic ties are temporarily severed from kin, caste and locality) or milder forms of
social boycott (not receiving honors in the temple, unable to employ service castes, etc.).
However,  of  all  the  cases  studied  or  perused  for  the  purpose  of  this  investigation,
Ganapathi Bhatta’s is the only one in which I found reference to excommunication as a
coercive device to enforce kin-caste rules.
47 Ganapathi Bhatta’s case, which followed the principles laid down in The Queen v. Sankara
examined previously, set a trend which was to be followed over the next two decades.
Unless a procedural flaw in the order of excommunication could be demonstrated by
complainants,  their  appeals  were  dismissed.  Flaws  were  found  in  the  mode  of
communication of the order (using the post office is not a valid custom), in the absence of
notice given to the individual regarding his excommunication (audi alterem partem cannot
be superseded by a custom), in the absence of an opportunity given to the individual to
explain himself regarding his alleged caste infraction.
 
Vengala Venkayya v. Thallam Venkataramiah (Case
study 3)
48 Some twenty years after Ganapathi Bhatta’s case was dismissed by the court, the Brahmin
judge’s opening sentences to the judgment of Vengala Venkayya v. Thallam Venkataramiah 
display a marked shift from his predecessors: “Social customs among Hindus have begun
to change with quite appreciable rapidity and conservative observations … even though
those  observations  were  made by  very  learned and eminent  judges  ought  not  to  be
pushed now a days too far” (Vengala Venkayya v. Thallam Venkataramiah 1914). The judge,
S. Aiyar, was delivering judgment on an excommunication having occurred in Kurnool
(present day Andhra Pradesh). Many facts of the case are quite close to those of the first
case study from 1883 (The Queen v. Sankara 1883): the complainant here is also from the
Komati caste and likewise attended a widow re-marriage. However the complainant did
not receive a written order of excommunication but he was turned away verbally from
the annual aradhana celebration in November 1911 by the priest (the defendant) and told
he was “not fit” as he took a meal at a widow remarriage. Though not pronounced out of
caste per se, the complainant took this to indicate he was excommunicated and went on
to sue the priest for defamation (section 499 and 500) in the court of the District Munsif
claiming 50 rupees as the amount of damages. He succeeded in getting a decree of 20
rupees  but  in  an  appeal  to  the  District  Court,  the  amount  was  disallowed  and  the
complainant’s suit dismissed.
49 The  content  of  the  judgment  of  his  second  appeal  is  quite  thorough  in  addressing
precedents for defamation, exploring the sociological background of the complainant and
defendant as well as the nature of their relations, citing classical texts (namely the laws of
Manu). However, throughout the text there lingers a sense that the judge is weary and
annoyed with the implications of the case. He begins by situating the nature of this case
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of excommunication within a set of three categories of excommunication cases which
have been brought to the colonial court over the last 30 years (1880–1910):
• firstly: it may be a suit brought by a member of a caste complaining of his expulsion from it
and asking for a declaration that the expulsion is illegal, and that he is still a member of the
caste and as such entitled to its social privileges
• secondly,  a  member  of  a  caste  expelled  from  it  may  sue  for  a  declaration  that  the
excommunication is illegal, and that he is entitled to certain rights of property or office as a
member of the caste: or,
• thirdly, it may be a suit brought by such member for damages on account of loss of caste or
character.
50 “The decided cases, of which there is a large number, show that a suit involving a caste
question  must  fall  under  one  or  other  of  these  heads”  (Vengala  Venkayya  v.  Thallam
Venkataramiah 1914). 
51 Vengala Venkayya’s suit falls within the third category. The judge moves on to criticize
what he believes is the too-wide definition of defamation in the Penal Code where caste
questions which do not include imputations of moral character are included (section 499,
explanation 4). His criticism rests on the fact that he believes giving up caste norms can
presently (he is writing in 1914) be seen as a sign of “moral strength … as is shown in the
actions of the members belonging to the Brahmo Samaj, the Arya Samaj and other liberal
movements”  (Vengala  Venkayya  v.  Thallam  Venkataramiah 1914).  The  judge  actually
expresses his regret that despite these reformist movements, the views in law “will not
seem  possible  to  unsettled  for  several  years  to  come”  (Vengala  Venkayya  v.  Thallam
Venkataramiah 1914). He is also rather scathing of the complainant’s grievance:
there is nothing to show that he has sustained any damage beyond the loss of some
dinners.  …  courts  ought  not  to  encourage  suits  for  libel  or  defamation  merely
because some of his (plaintiff’s) castemen or even a majority of his castemen state
that they will not associate with them in meals or ceremonies on the ground that he
holds reformed views (Vengala Venkayya v. Thallam Venkataramiah 1914). 
The judge does not condemn religious or social reforms (“that a person does not care for
the rigidity of caste rules is given as a sign of moral strength in many cases” [Vengala
Venkayya v.  Thallam Venkataramiah 1914])  but  chastises  those who,  having voluntarily
crossed that line, do not bear up under the social and religious ostracism it entails.
52 The judge’s opinion, as he points out several times, is not entirely relevant as he is bound
by his position to deliver judgment according to evidence, precedents and legislations. He
establishes that,  in this  case,  two questions need to be decided.  For one,  whether at
present (1914), supporting widow remarriage involves liability to excommunication and
two, whether the defendant’s statement (“you are unfit”) intended to impute that Vengala
Venkayya had lost his caste membership. The answers to these questions are, to large
extent, far less significant than what these questions imply for this investigation. The
first questions deals with the cause of the excommunication. Prior to this case, causes
were never addressed as cognizable matters by the court as they were seen as belonging
to the realm of caste jurisdiction and autonomy. Though the judge refers again, as he did
in the opening to his judgment, to The Queen v. Sankara (1883) and to M. Cuppusawmi Chetty
v.  A.T.  Doraisawmy  Chetty (1909 )  for  the  first  question  (widow  re-marriage),  the  two
presiding features of  these earlier cases and of  many others between 1880 and 1910,
which were the issues of legitimate authority (in pronouncing excommunications) and
procedural  correctness  (in  the  process  of  removing  someone  from  the  caste),  have
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completely vanished from the legal reasoning of this judgment in particular but also from
a number of those to follow.
53 For the final case studied below, we leap forward three decades. This jump is justified by
constraints  on  the  length  of  this  contribution,  not  by  the  fact  that  cases  involving
excommunications, whether as a direct object of the suits (defamation) or as a collateral
factor in marital or property disputes, did not reach the Madras High Court during this
period (see Table 3).
 
Ellappa Goundan and Ors. v. Ellappa Goundan (Case
study 4)
54 This case marks a clear departure from the majority of cases of the earlier period in at
least  three  important  ways:  firstly,  the  issues  are  not  related  to  religious  dogma or
observance;  secondly,  the matter came under the jurisdiction of  a panchayat,  not an
ecclesiastical  chief;  and  thirdly,  the  protagonist  belongs  to  a  relatively  low-caste
(Vanniars)38 as compared to those involved in the earlier cases (mainly Brahmin castes).
55 The facts in this case occurred between February and September 1947 in Chingleput, a
town close to Chennai (present day Tamil Nadu). Ellappa Gounder’s married daughter,
living in her father’s house,  was allegedly “having illegitimate intimacy” with an Adi
Dravidar (a Tamil term for Dalit). Ellappa was told by representatives of the locality to
throw her out of his house but he refused to do so. He was summoned to a multi-caste
panchayat where he was pronounced outcaste. During the panchayat several interdicts
were admonished which the court judgment specifies: the village washerman and barber
were ordered not to render service to him; honors given to him at the Amman temple as
periyadhanakar,  should  be  withheld;  and  his  deeparadhanai for  the  deity  should  be
refused. These interdicts are common to most outcastings I have studied in rural settings.
The consequences of not being provided the services of the washerman and barber are
much more far-reaching than sporting stubble or wearing a dirty dhoti. These two service
castes were (and still are, in many social settings) indispensable in a large number of life-
cycle  rituals  such  as  birth,  puberty,  ear-boring,  marriage,  death.  Without  their
participation, the pollution concomitant to many of these situations cannot be avoided or
removed. Besides the first interdict, the humiliation and stigma of being refused honors
must  have  been  devastating  for  Ellappa.  These  honors  (mariyadai)  consist  of  ritual
offerings (vibuti, prasadam, etc.) as well as an order of precedence both in receiving them
and being able to perform oblations.  Prior to his outcasting,  Ellappa’s ranking in the
order  of  precedence in the temple must  have been quite  high as  he was  the periya
dhanakar, that is the main patron and decision maker for the temple. The final interdict,
which bans him from waving a  camphor flame in front of  the deity  (deeparadhanai),
forbids him any possibility of collective rituals and personal devotion.
56 Ellappa brought his  case against  the panchayat  in front of  the Additional  First  Class
Magistrate in Chingleput. The defense of the six panchayattars was relatively weak. Their
council in the Magistrate court stated that since it was the defendants themselves who
submitted concrete evidence that Ellappa was indeed excommunicated and the precise
dates of the events, the convictions against the panchayattars should be viewed as illegal.
This line of defense was found to be insufficient and the six men were convicted under
section 500 of the Penal Code (Defamation) and sentenced to 50 rupees each or to each
Adjudicating Social Death: Caste Exclusion, Civil Rights and the Colonial Hig...
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 17 | 2018
23
undergo three months of simple imprisonment. The Madras High Court, to which the
panchayattars appealed to overturn the Magistrate’s judgment,  found the defamatory
acts had been fully proved and the magistrate’s sentence correct and proper.
57 However, the judgment from the High Court, which is very short as compared to the
earlier ones, goes a step further than the Magistrate’s. Though the act of defamation was
established, the judge reiterates the principle of caste autonomy but adds a very specific
restrictive clause as to the validity of the jurisdiction of a caste panchayat: 
it is obvious that while a caste, like the Vannia caste, will have a customary right to
go into allegations of immorality made against a woman of their tribe, in order to
safeguard caste purity and prestige, no such customary right has been given to a
composite assembly consisting of various castes like barbers, pipers, washer-man,
Yadavas  and  others  …  So,  privilege,  which  could  have  been  claimed  by  the
petitioners had they been confined to panchayat members of the interested caste,
namely, Vannikula Kshatrias, will not be available as all kinds of castes and tribes
were allowed to take part in the enquiry. It was not a caste panchayat outcasting a
member of that caste for a caste offence. This petition deserves to be and is hereby
dismissed (Ellappa Goundan and Ors. v. Ellappa Goundan 1949). 
So despite the many departures from the general norm and shape of the preceding cases,
this present case displays nonetheless a fundamental similarity with those which precede
it. It is the issue of legitimate authority to pronounce the excommunication on which
rests  the  judgment.  Since  the  court  establishes  that  a  multi-caste  panchayat  cannot
legitimately  vote  the  expulsion of  an individual  from a  specific  subcaste  the  case  is
dismissed. I have not come across any other case, and neither does the judgment cite any
precedent for this matter, giving consideration to the structure of a panchayat in order to
appraise its legitimacy. Many of the earlier cases examined in great detail whether the
caste guru having pronounced the excommunication was truly the complainant’s direct
ecclesiastical  chief;  however no specific  consideration was given as  to their  common
affiliation to the exact same subcaste. The dismissal of the village panchayat’s legitimacy
is somewhat at odds with the prevalent appreciation at the time of the value of caste
panchayats versus village panchayats (i.e. multi-caste panchayats). Indeed, the endeavor
of  the  1911  Census  to  appraise  the  situation  of  local  governance  concluded  that
unfortunately the village panchayat, a vivid symbol of local democracy in the minds of
orientalist and colonial administrators of the 19th century, had given way to informal
tribunals  serving  the  purposes  of caste  factions.  It  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this
contribution to discuss the fiction of these representations though it is interesting to note
that at the time the judgment was passed the so-called village (multi-caste) panchayat
was inspirational to Gandhi’s vision of an independent decentralized Indian government.
 
Conclusion
58 This contribution has addressed a discreet but significant aspect of the ever complex
phenomena of group membership in the Indian subcontinent in the late modern period.
The (very tense) relationship between caste society and State Law as we know it today
had, during colonial rule, a very different character. The most important and enduring
legislation which shaped the legal trajectory of caste in the colonial courts in general, and
caste excommunication in particular, dates back at least to the Elphinstone Code of 1827
but was in all likelihood actually in practice earlier. The principle which it laid down, that
of the non-cognizance of caste questions in the civil courts, was reiterated in Section 9 of
the Civil Procedure Code (1908). This principle can be read as an attempt by the colonial
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administration to separate caste from the State. However, this principle was extremely
complex to  apply,  as  numerous judges  realized and as  commentators  such as  Kikani
stated plainly: “the task of ascertaining what is or what is not a caste question has been
very often proved to be a question of  great difficulty” (Kikani  1912:ii).  The potential
tension that could have unfolded in the courts between the social rights (of a caste) and
the  civil  rights  (of  an  individual)  never  really  broke  out.  Though  many  cases  of
excommunication  originated  from  differing  views  over  religious  dogma  and  though
several judges took the opportunity to display their erudition and sometimes share their
personal opinions,  the judgments are always careful not to interfere. Throughout the
cases of  caste excommunication examined here,  the emphasis given by the judges to
procedural  correctness  (did  the  guru’s  jurisdiction  legitimately  extend  to  the
excommunicated individual, was his authority exercised bona fide, was noticed delivered
and in which form, was the excommunicated individual given an opportunity to defend
himself, etc.?) over substantive considerations (did the nature of the breach in kin-caste
rules  justify  temporary  or  permanent  exclusion  from  the  birth  group,  was  this
punishment to be envisaged as a religious or secular sanction, were damages for its often
devastating consequences to be entertained, etc.?) was a fairly constant pattern in the
process  of  their  legal  reasoning over  caste  exclusion.  This  exploration into the legal
trajectory of caste exclusion over seventy years in the Madras High Court sheds a rather
different light on a number of facts and characterizations. It has established that, against
the grain of  Dumont’s  assertion,  caste “excommunications” were indeed a feature of
social, religious and legal life in South India and that, against Gnanambal’s statement,
these intra-caste litigations were brought before the colonial court. This investigation has
also  displayed  a  colonial  judiciary  far  from  subjugated  by  Brahminic  ideology  and
certainly not bound to sastric world-views, in stark contrast to prevailing representations
of the British colonial judiciary.
59 I  close  this  investigation  on  the  eve  of  a  new  chapter  in  the  legal  trajectory  of
excommunications in India.
60 The Bombay Prevention of Excommunication Act (Bombay Act XLII of 1949) rendered all
excommunications unlawful. However, this Act was to be short-lived as it was challenged
under Article 26 (Freedom of Religion) and declared unconstitutional by the Supreme
Court in 1962. Despite the fact that castes could not be considered religious groups as
such,  the  cumulative  ambiguities  of  the  notion  of  “community”  (a  social  group  /  a
religious group) and of the religious coloring of the term used by the courts to address
social  death (‘excommunication’)  led a number of suits concerning caste exclusion to
come under the purview of article 26.
61 For the next forty years, the legal history of excommunication followed its course, both
inside and outside courts of law, drawing very little attention to itself,  much like the
earlier period we have examined here. However, the legal and media anonymity of caste
excommunication has been chiseled away over the last decade as the judicial practices of
caste panchayat have come under increasing legal scrutiny. In the spring of 2016, the
state  of  Maharashtra  passed  a  bill  prohibiting  social  boycott  which  now  establishes
excommunication as a cognizable offence and provides for imprisonment for up to three
years or a fine of one lakh, or both.39 Whether other Indian states will follow Maharashtra
by enshrining their legal battle against the hold of caste panchayats in the form of a Bill is
a chapter yet to unfold.
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NOTES
1. Cartoon published in the Indian Express.
2. I  have chosen in  this  contribution to  largely  rely  on the term “exclusion” in  my general
discussion and “caste excommunication” when discussing data from the colonial court as it is the
term most commonly used in the court judgments of the colonial period. However, the social
death of a Hindu has been variously coined in the English language: “caste excommunication,”
“suspension from caste,” “caste exclusion,” “loss of caste,” “out-casting.” I will, on occasion, be
using one or the other interchangeably, whilst always referring to the same phenomenon.
3. By “caste panchayats” I refer to local judicial assemblies. Though often composed of a single
caste, multi-caste panchayats have been observed in the literature and also by the author.
4. The author has reviewed the works of Fuchs (1951), Srinivas (1954), Cohn (1959), Goswami
(1963),  Fürer-Haimendorf  (1967),  Hiebert  (1971),  Mandelbaum  (1972),  Malhotra  (1979),  Misra
(1978).
5. A notebook on the DATAH project "A Digital Archive of Tamil Agrarian History (1650–1950)" is
viewable here: http://clac.hypotheses.org/
6. Further research is needed, to examine in detail to what extent, if at all in some instances, the
formulations and language used result from an emulation of court documentation produced by
the courts of the Crown.
7. Kuruthedatta v. M.P.V.D. Namboodiri (1866) 1 Ind. Jur. N.S. 236.
8. S. Sureshkumar v. The District Collector (2016), W.P.(MD) No. 17119 of 2012
9. The only exception is the landmark case of (1962) Sardar Syedna Taher Saifuddin v. The State Of
Bombay. The legal trajectory of caste exclusion after Independence will be addressed in a third
contribution on this topic: Headley, “From Social Death to Social Boycott: New Avatars of Caste
Excommunication” (forthcoming).
10. Most notably the numerous “Castes and tribes of…” or “Tribes and Caste of…” (South India,
Bombay,  North-Western Provinces,  Punjab,  Central  Provinces,  etc.),  which were encyclopedic
compilations of social groups.
11. Especially  chapter 8,  “The  British  as  patrons  of  the  Sastra”  and  chapter 9,  “The
administration of Hindu law by the British.”
12. The Tagore law lectures were an important series of lectures on various topics of law during
the British period,  which were funded by the Tagore family (Calcutta).  The first  lecture was
organized in 1870 and, according to the records of digitized documents of Senate House (Calcutta
University), the last lecture took place in 1986, with a total of 97 published lectures.
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13. Mountsuart Elphinstone (1779–1859), who was Governor of the Bombay Presidency between
1819 and 1827,  found “the need for a better and more uniform system of law … in 1827 the
Elphinstone Code took shape as a formal and ordered set of Regulations (about thirty in number)
drafted upon a uniform system—an improvement in certain details upon the Cornwallis code of
1793” (Rankin 1946:195).
14. The Elphinstone code was applicable in the Bombay Presidency. However, the principle of
non-cognizance of the caste question was applied, verbatim, in the Madras Presidency.
15. See Guilmoto (1998).
16. See Venkatachalapathy (2011).
17. “The term dharma may be translated as “Law” if we do not limit ourselves to its narrow
modern definition as civil and criminal statutes but take it to include all the rules of behavior,
including moral and religious behavior, that a community recognizes as binding on its members”
(Olivelle 2000:1).
18. See Cohn (1971).
19. See Derrett (1968:225–267), “The British as patrons of the Sastra.”
20. I only once this essay was finished did I become aware that studies on outcasts during the
early colonial period specifically have been conducted by Arpana Balachandran There are also
some  interesting  studies  of  the  exercise  of  courts  under  the  East  India  Company  such  as
Meschievitz (1986) and Mines (2001).
21. The Bengal Regulation (or Cornwallis Code) constitutes the foundation of the legal system
introduced  by  the  British  in  India.  Regulation  III  was  concerned  with  setting  forth  the
jurisdictions  of  the  courts  of  the  Diwani  Adalat.  See  Aspinal  (1931).  For  an  overview of  the
Cornwallis code see Fisher-Tine and Mann (2004:41–46).
22. Two cases, briefly described by the same author, are dated from 1847 (Sonaram v. Obhayram)
and 1848 (Soonaoolla v. Mohussun) (Kikani 1912:127).
23. For study on the differences between the Calcutta and Madras understanding of Hindu Law
see Davis (2009).
24. As mentioned before the preamble of the Act itself, this premise was initially “contained in
section 9 of Regulation VII of 1832 of the Bengal Code.” In its 1850 version, its principles were
extended “to all territories subject to the Government of East India Company” (Caste Disabilities
Removal Act, 1850).
25. A good overview of the complexities and caseloads can be found in Roy (1911), chapter 9 “The
burden  of  procedure”  and  Swamy  (2016).  Several  studies  exist  on  the  question  of  forum
shopping: Srinivas (1962), Rudolph and Rudolph (1965), Holden (2003).
26. Two other High Courts were opened during the colonial period, the Karnataka High Court in
1891 and the Punjab High Court in 1919. There are at present 24 High Courts in India.
27. The best online source for digitized copies of the Indian Law Reports: Madras Series is Hathi
Trust Digital Library (https://www.hathitrust.org/). Internet Archive (https://archive.org/) was
also used.
28. The terminology changes during the post-colonial period where one finds namely “social
boycott” and “social ostracism,” which refer to the situation of caste exclusion but also to other
situations of intra-caste discrimination (caste excommunication being by essence an inter-caste,
or more precisely an inter-subcaste sanction).
29. In the course of this research I surveyed the overall occurrence of caste exclusion across the
five High Courts in existence during the colonial period and the Madras High Court displayed the
highest number of cases. However the significance of this fact is undermined by the blind spot
mentioned earlier regarding the absence of data concerning cases brought to the lower courts.
Could it simply mean that the lower courts of the Calcutta or Bombay presidencies were more
efficient at disposing of such cases?
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30. The earliest case I identified is much earlier (1866) and involved some influential Malayali
Brahmins (Namboodiris); however I was unfortunately not able to consult it. Case reference: 1
Ind. Jur. N.S. 236
31. Hereafter referred to as The Queen v. Sankara.
32. Interestingly, the judgment notes in passing that during the hearing it was pointed out (by
whom is unclear) that these alliances could have been challenged on the ground that they were
contracted  within  a  prohibited  line  of  descent,  which  is  contrary  to  the  caste  in  question
(Komati), but this was not done.
33. Sections 499 and 500 of  the IPC are currently being challenged in the Supreme Court as
unconstitutional  (article  19  (1)  on  the  freedom of  speech).  Defamation  is  both  a  civil  and  a
criminal offense in India.
34. M. Cuppusawmi Chettyvs A.T. Doraisawmy Chetty and Ors. [3 IndCas 955]
35. Rudolph  and  Rudolph,  in  their  study  on  barristers  and  Brahmins,  point  out  that  more
generally the importance of procedural correctness is enhanced when “tribunals are not part of
the situation—the village, the caste—in which disputes or crimes arise” (1965:25).
36. South Canara,  a  district  of  the Madras  Presidency,  covered the areas  of  the present-day
districts of Dakshina Kannada and Udupi (Karnataka) and Kasaragod (Kerala).  Mangalore,  the
administrative  headquarters  of  South  Canara  is  located  some  700  kilometers  from  Madras
(Chennai).
37. Exception  partly  made  of  Ellappa  Goundan  and  Ors.  v.  Ellappa  Goundan (1949),  where  the
panchayat was multi-caste.
38. Though  the  caste  title  of  the  protagonist  is  Goundar,  they  are  all  clearly  identified
throughout the judgment as Vanniars.  Further Vanniars are numerically predominant in the
area in which the events took place.
39. The Maharashtra Prohibition of Social Boycott act was voted on the 14th of April 2016.
ABSTRACTS
This  contribution is  part  of  a  larger investigation into the phenomena of  out-casting among
Hindus  in  South India.  Here,  I  seek to  unravel  the  legal  trajectory  of  caste  exclusion in  the
colonial  court  by  examining  the  occurrence,  extent  and  content  (legal  and  social)  of  these
litigations. I begin by examining the legal status of caste, as a body, under British rule. Caste
exclusion being  one kind of  punitive  sanction,  among a  range  of  other  sanctions  applied  in
situations of a severe breach in kin-caste rules, it is necessary to examine what understanding
was arrived at regarding these rules and which legal treatments were applied. I then explore the
occurrence of  suits  involving caste excommunication and present the main features of  some
twelve cases to get an overall sense of the nature of the litigations involving excommunication,
the outcomes, the social profiles of those involved. Finally, I look more deeply into a handful of
cases to assess the grievances of the (excommunicated) complainants and the strategies of the
defendants.  The  aim  is  to  identify  the  legal  provisions  invoked  both  by  complainants  and
defendants  and  to  unravel  the  reasoning  of  the  judges  caught  between  considerations  of
promoting individual civil rights, while not infringing on caste social rights.
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